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ABSTRACT 
The economic transformation in countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as Asia 
resulted in a diverse picture of change in agricultural labour use. Based on a measure of 
sectoral labour adjustment, the paper explores the determinants of occupational labour flows 
paying special attention to the impact of institutions. Annual rates of occupational migration 
between agriculture and non-agriculture over the period 1978-2005 are calculated for a panel 
of 30 transition countries. Annual migration from agriculture ranges from outflows of nearly 8 
percent of the agricultural labour force to immigration into agriculture about 9 percent on 
average. Fixed-effects panel models are used to explain the annual intersectoral labour flow. 
The most important determinants of the migration rate are the relative income differences 
between non-agricultural and agricultural sectors, the relative magnitude of agricultural 
labour, the development of terms of trade and the level of unemployment. Furthermore, the 
speed of economic reforms and the way of land privatization affect occupational migration 
significantly. An increasing intersectoral income difference points to still existing mobility 
restrictions for agricultural labour in some of the countries analyzed. 
Keywords: aggregated labour allocation, intersectoral income differential, institutions, 
transition economies 
JEL classification: E24, J43, J62, Q18 
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AGRICULTURAL LABOUR ADJUSTMENT AND THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Former socialist economies underwent tremendous changes since the start of the economic 
reforms. In most of these countries, agriculture was collectivized and intersectoral movement 
of labour was more or less restricted before the break-up of the economic planning system. 
Economic reforms implied decollectivization, privatization of land and assets, adjustment of 
relative prices and liberalization of labour markets. However, the speed and degree of 
reforms’ implementation varied widely between the different countries (see for instance 
Rozelle and Swinnen, 2004).  
A striking result is the significant divergence in agricultural labour productivity and 
agricultural labour use over the (post-) reform period. Whereas Central European and East 
Asian countries experienced an increase of labour productivity after reforms, the drop is 
highest for Transcaucasian and Central Asian countries. Figure 1 presents the relative change 
of agricultural employment since the beginning of economic reforms up to 2005. Countries 
are ranked following the index of agricultural liberalization by Csaki and Zuschlag (2003) and 
grouped into fast, medium and slow reformers. The steepest drop in agriculture’s share on 
total employment is observed in the so called group of fast reformers. Similarly, China and 
Vietnam are examples of a very early decollectivization, and they experienced a comparable 
decrease of agricultural employment over a 10-years longer period. On the contrary, several 
moderately and slowly reforming countries show an increase in agriculture’s share in 
employment. In Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, and Tajikistan 
agriculture’s share even increased by more than 50%.  
 
Figure 1 around here 
 
The adjustment of agricultural labour to new economic conditions seems to take different 
paths and to proceed at different speeds. Nevertheless, little remains known about the 
institutional determinants of those different adjustment processes. The primary goal of our 
paper is to examine institutional and policy-related reasons behind this almost unprecedented 
and diverse change in agricultural labour use. We use a measure to quantify the change in 
agricultural labour use for transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well as 
South East Asia. Subsequently, the measure is regressed on macroeconomic variables and 
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indicators of the institutional environment. The paper’s contribution to the literature is 
twofold. First, it goes beyond previous literature by including all European and Asian 
countries in transition. The analysis, second, centres around indicators of the institutional 
environment and ways of land privatisation as determinants of labour adjustment.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
identified determinants of labour adjustment and motivates the relevance of the institutional 
environment. Section 3 introduces the measure of labour adjustment and the explanatory 
variables. The first part of section 4 presents the evolution of labour adjustment over time and 
the second sub-section presents the results of the econometric analysis. The paper ends up 
with a conclusion. 
 
2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE  
Agriculture has played two different roles in labour markets of transition countries. First, 
surplus agricultural labour has been shed from former state and collective farms after the 
removal of subsidies, central planning and mobility restrictions. Hidden unemployment in 
agriculture during the period of central planning has been observed in almost all countries. 
Brada (1989) and Jackman (1994), for instance, underline this finding with comparatively 
high figures of hidden unemployment in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Other studies emphasize 
the buffer role of agriculture, e.g., in form of subsistence farms, in periods of high 
unemployment and economic uncertainty (Sorm & Terrell, 2000). This buffer role will result 
in a reduced outflow of labour from agriculture or even an inflow into this sector. For 
instance, Seeth, Chachnov, Surinov, & von Braun (1998) describe how emerging private 
subsistence agriculture serves as an insurance against poverty and hunger using the example 
of Russia. Pallot & Nefedova (2003) put forward additional examples mainly from Russia. 
Similar evidence is reported by Bernabè & Stampini (2009) for rural Georgia, where inflow 
of labour into agriculture increased after the Russian economic crisis of 1998. However, they 
find an over-representation of retirement-aged as well as previously inactive people in 
agricultural employment. 
Micro-economic empirical analysis of determinants of agricultural labour adjustment centres 
mainly on farm household decisions and studies analyze either cross-sectional or panel micro-
level data (Bojnec & Dries (2005); Chaplin et al. (2004) and Buchenrieder et al. (2002) for 
CEEC; Glauben et al., (2008); Zhang et al., (2004); de Brauw et al., (2002); Brosig, Glauben, 
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Herzfeld, Rozelle, & Wang, (2007) for China).
1
 Important determinants of agricultural labour 
adjustment that are identified in these studies are education of household members, household 
composition and regional characteristics. However, studies at the micro-level are of limited 
use to derive policy conclusions. Especially the impact of macroeconomic reforms and 
institutional change can only be quantified partially.  
Determinants of intersectoral labour adjustment from a macro-economic perspective are 
extensively discussed and summarized by Larson & Mundlak (1997) and Bojnec & Dries 
(2005). In line with traditional theories of migration, like Todaro’s (1969) seminal work, they 
highlight the differences in (expected future) incomes as the dominating force of flows. A 
number of empirical findings support these hypotheses. Butzer et al. (2003, 2002) find 
evidence that the income ratio between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, the growth of 
non-agricultural employment, and the unutilized capacity in non-agriculture are the main 
determinants of labour flows out of agriculture.  
Focusing less on outside conditions and more on factors inside the agricultural sector, 
Swinnen et al. (2005) show that important drivers of labour outflow from agriculture are 
decreasing agricultural prices and any development which will increase the reservation wage 
of agricultural workers. Furthermore, the authors find a significant and negative impact of the 
development of relative agricultural wages on agricultural employment. Dries & Swinnen 
(2002) observe a highly significant reduction of agriculture’s share in employment in 
relatively more developed Polish macro-regions. This effect is found to be even stronger in 
regions with a better infrastructure as well as in younger and better educated farm 
populations.  
Although the importance of institutions like property rights on land, hard budget constraints, 
the framework for contract enforcement and access to capital is widely acknowledged in the 
theoretical literature, its quantitative assessment in econometric studies is still quite limited. 
Overarching and effective property rights on land are seen as necessary requirement to raise 
efficiency of agricultural production (Lerman, Csaki, & Feder, 2004, Swinnen, 1999). 
Applying a more formalized theoretical framework, Swinnen, Dries, & Macours (2005) 
conclude that an effective privatization of old-style corporate farms and the break-up into 
profit-maximizing private family farms will reduce the employed labour in agriculture. 
                                                 
1
 Additionally, interregional migration in China forms a widely discussed topic in the literature. Migrants move 
from rural to urban regions or from poor Western to rich Eastern Chinese provinces (Taylor & Rozelle, 2003). 
For recent and extended surveys on the general subject of migration see Massey et al. (1993) as well as Taylor & 
Martin (2001). 
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Furthermore, the reorganisation is expected to lower wages up to the equality with the value 
marginal product of labour. However, increasing labour efficiency might partially offset the 
latter effect.  
Looking for empirical evidence, Swinnen, et al. (2005) discover three patterns of agricultural 
labour adjustment based on the organizational transformation of  agriculture. In Estonia, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, a fast decline of the share of agriculture in total 
employment together with a moderate increase in the share of individual farms in total 
agricultural land. On the other hand, agricultural employment decreased less rapidly or even 
increased in Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia and Slovenia, countries with a significantly 
higher prevalence of individual farms. Finally, individual farming in Russia and Ukraine still 
exhibits only a minor share in total landholdings and the change in agricultural employment is 
at the same time limited. These patterns are confirmed in econometric analyses. Dries & 
Swinnen (2002) as well as Swinnen et al. (2005) find agricultural employment to be reduced 
significantly faster with an increasing share of privatized land. In contrast, the share of land 
used by individual farms has a significant and positive effect on agricultural employment. The 
authors conclude that the variable ‘share of privatized land’ captures the effect of the 
introduction of hard budget constraints. Furthermore, new agricultural employment is only 
created on private family farms.  
Previous studies neglect the ways of land privatisation and measures of the institutional 
quality as potential determinants of labour adjustment. They are important for two reasons: 
tenure security on land is expected to facilitate land market development and farm 
specialisation. Functioning land markets ease the exiting of farmers. Similarly, a low quality 
of the institutional environment might hamper the general economic development and farmers 
might stick to agricultural production to assure household’s food supply.  
 
3 METHODOLOGY AND DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
3.1 Measuring labour adjustment 
In pursuing the theoretical base introduced by Mundlak (1978) and developed further by 
Barkley (1990), sectoral labour adjustments can be analyzed within a framework of 
occupational choice. Each individual is assumed to maximize an indirect utility function 
depending on personal characteristics, realised income or expected income in any other 
occupation, prices of consumption goods and costs of migration. The remaining life time 
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utility of any individual can be derived by discounting the stream of utility for each 
occupation up to his retirement age. Usually expected earnings and switching costs enter the 
maximization as most important determinants of life time utility (Mundlak, 2000). At a 
positive difference of the discounted indirect utility in any other occupation and the 
discounted indirect utility in agricultural employment a shift of occupation is expected to take 
place. 
Under the assumption of an economy with two sectors, agriculture and non-agriculture, and a 
mutually exclusive character of occupations, aggregated shifts between sectors are defined as 
sectoral labour adjustment.
2
 We quantify this movement by the difference of growth rates in 
total and agricultural employment and use this measure as dependent variable in the following 
econometric analysis. More specifically, the labour adjustment rate (m) is calculated as the 
difference between growth rates of total labour (L) and agricultural labour (LA). The 
adjustment rate can be interpreted as relative to the size of the agricultural sector. 
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where n is the growth rate of total labour and nA designates the growth rate of agricultural 
labour. In the absence of migration, the natural growth rates of agricultural labour and total 
employment are assumed to be equal. This measure has been suggested first by Mundlak 
(1978) and has been used in econometric analyses by Butzer et al. (2003, 2002) focusing on 
Venezuela and Southeast Asian countries, respectively. The measure suffers from one 
limitation which has to be kept in mind. Due to the assumption of equal growth rates of 
agricultural and total employment, a drop in total employment leads per definition to a 
hypothetical migration into agriculture as long as |n| > |nA|. As almost every transition country 
has been characterised by a higher shares of industrial employment under central planning 
compared to countries at a similar stage of economic development (Raiser, et al., 2004), 
(virtual) immigration into agriculture will be caused by the downsizing of the industrial 
sector.  
                                                 
2
 Any aggregated approach neglects part-time farming represents which forms a non-negligible part of 
agricultural households’ activities also in transition countries (Chaplin et al., 2004; Buchenrieder et al., 2002). 
That is, the measure applied in this paper will understate the ‘true’ sectoral labour allocation as long as off-farm 
occupations are not recorded as an individual’s main economic activity in official statistics and overstate labour 
adjustment whenever households continue to engage on household plots besides any registered main non-
agricultural employment. However, lack of individual employment data which are consistently comparable over 
all transition countries limits the use of other concepts. 
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In previous studies, labour market transformation is usually assessed using shares of sectoral 
employment. Based on the theory of structural change and economic development and the 
related empirical work by Chenery & Taylor (1968), Raiser, Schaffer, & Schuchhardt (2004) 
compare sectoral change in employment shares for 22 transition countries. Results by Raiser, 
et al. (2004) support the observation of over-industrialization during central planning. 
Interestingly, employment in agriculture at the beginning of the transition was clearly lower 
than predicted by the benchmark. However, the authors do not undertake any further 
econometric analysis of changes in the distortion index and its determinants. Dries and 
Swinnen (2002) as well as Swinnen et al. (2005) focus on the development of agricultural 
labour’s share, more specifically the yearly percentage change of labour employed in 
agriculture since the beginning of economic reforms. Whereas the first study uses data from 
Polish macro-regions between 1990 and 1997, the second analysis concentrates on seven 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe over the period 1989-1998. In both studies, the 
measure is of cumulative nature and might create inconsistencies in a panel of countries with 
a different length of reform period. Raiser, et al. (2004) as well as Swinnen et al. (2005) 
assume implicitly a development of agricultural labour towards a similar share in all transition 
countries. 
 
3.2 Determinants of agricultural labour adjustment 
Previous literature provides a range of determinants that possibly impact the occupational 
choice at an aggregated level. Starting from the theoretical framework proposed by Larson & 
Mundlak (1997), labour flows are a function of the ratio of incomes in non-agriculture to that 
in agriculture, the size of the originating sector and the rate of population growth. The 
relevance of the income ratio is supported by earlier theoretical models of migration like 
Todaro’s seminal work (Todaro, 1969, Harris & Todaro, 1970, Zarembka, 1970), where rural-
urban migration is understood as a mechanism to equalize expected marginal earnings in 
agriculture (rural) and non-agricultural (urban) sectors. Institutions which limit intersectoral 
mobility may restrict this equalization. A very prominent example is the hukuo system in 
China which restricted people’s move from rural areas, highly dominated by agricultural 
production at the end of the 1970s, to cities. Lack of individual and internationally 
comparable wage rates requires us to approximate wages by an average productivity measure. 
Thus, the ratio of value-added per worker originating from non-agricultural sectors to 
agricultural value added per labourer is expected to be one of the main determinants of 
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occupational migration in the empirical analysis below. Relatively high earnings in non-
agricultural sectors will attract labour to flow out of agriculture.  
Furthermore, following the theoretical literature one should expect migration to increase with 
the relative magnitude of agricultural labour, which constitutes the source of supply (Harris & 
Todaro, 1970, Zarembka, 1970). A higher share of agricultural employment constitutes a 
larger pool of potential labour moving to other sectors. Additionally, a high unemployment 
rate might on the one hand slow down structural change by lowering expectations with 
respect to potential earnings in non-agricultural sectors. On the other hand high 
unemployment imposes a threat towards new entrants into employment, implicitly absolutely 
increasing the presented measures above at a given growth rate of agricultural labour. Hence, 
the direct and indirect effect of unemployment has to be controlled for in the econometric 
analysis. Economic recovery proceeded at a different pace across sectors. For instance, 
growth rates in service sectors are on average higher than in agriculture or construction. As a 
substitute of sectorally differentiating unemployment rates, a measure of unutilised capacity 
in the respective sector is calculated identical to that suggested by Butzer et al. (2002) at 
economy level.  
The main interest of this paper is, however, in the impact of a country’s institutional 
environment and arrangements.  It is widely acknowledged that laws, regulations, and 
contracts structure and / or constrain agents’ daily behaviour and decision making. Obviously, 
the choice and timing of certain reforms influences the emerging new institutional 
environment. For instance, the establishment of full private property rights through 
privatization is expected to stimulate interest of the new owners to secure their property rights 
(Koester & Brümmer, 2006). To start with the (dominant) way of land privatization, full 
ownership of a production factor like land is characterized by the right to use it for production 
purposes as well as collateral and to sell it. Similarly, Koester & Brümmer (2006) interpret 
the strong persistence of cooperatives and collective farms on the one hand and the 
widespread existence of household plots in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine as an indication of an 
incomplete property rights transfer. In line with Deiniger (2003) it is argued that secure land 
rights support on-farm investments and increase productivity. To sum up, it is expected that a 
complete transfer of property rights via restitution will lead to a stronger shift of labour out of 
agriculture compared to the other two methods. On the contrary, the (in kind) distribution of 
land is expected to lead to a lower occupational migration. 
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At the same time, transition countries undertake reforms to change their total economic 
system from central planning to functioning market economies. In line with North (1991) it is 
assumed that transaction costs of exchanges will decrease with a proper establishment of 
property rights. Subsequently, lower transaction costs are expected to result in a higher 
employment of capital relative to labour and/ or a higher prevalence of long-term agreements 
if, for instance, property rights are clearly defined and effective. The hypothesis is backed up 
be a variety of empirical studies highlighting the economic growth and investment promoting 
effect of a high quality of the general institutional environment.
3
 Summing up, faster reforms 
and a higher institutional quality are expected to foster occupational change.  
Political intervention into agriculture before the introduction of the first economic reforms 
varied substantially across the previously centrally planned countries ranging from an implicit 
taxation of agricultural production in East Asia to an implicit subsidisation in the CEEC and 
countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Additionally, liberalisation of prices proceeded 
very differently in the respective countries (Rozelle & Swinnen, 2004). As discussed above, 
relative competitiveness of agriculture depends on price relations. Therefore, it is controlled 
for the impact of relative prices’ adjustment. Obviously, a more favourable development of 
agricultural prices should have a limiting effect on labour adjustment.  
 
3.3 Econometric framework: Data and specification 
Data 
To calculate the measures of occupational migration, annual sectoral labour data are taken 
from World Bank (2010), FAO (2010), ILO (2010), and United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (2010) and are completed with information from national statistical 
yearbooks. Data are available for 30 transition countries from Europe and Asia.
4
 Employment 
in agriculture refers to people who have their principle activity within agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing.
5
 Starting in 1989, most transition countries linked their national 
                                                 
3
 For instance Aron (2000) provides a detailed critical survey. 
4
 The countries are: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Rozelle & Swinnen (2004) include additionally Laos and Myanmar, but 
explanatory data for them are lacking. 
5
 The categories correspond to the major divisions A and B in the third revised version of the International 
Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) and major division 1 in the second revision of the ISIC. Processing of 
agricultural products beyond levels required for primary markets, marketing through cooperatives and field 
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classification to international standards. The ten new EU member states within the group of 
transition countries implemented EU regulations and aligned their national statistical systems 
over the 1990s. To conclude, possible measurement errors due to problems with the statistical 
system are expected to minimize with the passage of time.
6
 Finally, Butzer, Larson, & 
Mundlak (2002; p. 246) show that measurement errors in agricultural employment have only 
very limited impact on the estimated migration series.  
So far variables are not specifically focusing the transition country context. This will be done 
in subsequent stepwise extensions of the basis specification. Much of the debate in the 
literature focuses on the speed of economic reforms, contrasting gradualism (e.g., China) with 
shock therapy (e.g., Estonia). The EBRD transition indicator (EBRD) is used to control for the 
impact of the general economic reforms’ speed.
7
 An increasing occupational migration due to 
faster economic reforms would support the ‘restructuring hypothesis’. The general level of 
institutional quality is approximated by two measures: An indicator of Contract-intensive 
money (CIM) first proposed by Clague, Keefer, Knack, & Olson (1999) and a composite 
indicator of good governance assembled by Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2009). CIM is 
defined as the ratio of non-currency money to the total money supply and reflects the ability 
of firms to raise capital and the reliance on third-party enforcement. The composite 
governance indicator pools subjective indices for six dimensions of governance: voice and 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and corruption from various sources. 
The way of land privatization is captured by introducing three dummy variables: distribution 
of land in shares (Shares), distribution of land in kind (Distribution) and restitution of land to 
the former owners (Restitution). Countries without a universal collectivisation of agriculture, 
Poland and all successor states of the former Yugoslavia, serve as reference.  
With respect to intersectoral income differences, most authors use average sectoral income 
per worker instead of marginal income due to data limitations. Wages are thought to be less 
informative due to the existence of other additional pecuniary and non-pecuniary income 
components and uncertainty regarding the probability to find employment in the preferred 
sector. On the other hand, the use of sectoral income may suffer from politically induced price 
                                                                                                                                                        
preparation involving construction work like terracing are excluded from agricultural activities in the ISIC 
nomenclature. 
6
 For a more detailed description of changes in national statistics and reliability of data the interested reader is 
referred to World Bank (1996) and UNECE (2000). 
7
 Unfortunately, the two Asian countries China and Vietnam have to be excluded from all specifications 
comprising the EBRD index due to data unavailability. 
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differences between agriculture and non-agriculture. Another source of measurement error 
may be a differing informal sector’s share in both sectors. Finally, Schmitt (1989) points to a 
measurement error of sectoral labour productivity due to non-agricultural output produced by 
labour forces officially recorded as agricultural labour. Unfortunately, sufficient means of 
correction are lacking. However, it is assumed that the importance of the finally mentioned 
source of measurement error will vanish with the progress of decollectivisation and 
restructuring of old-type cooperatives. Hence, the income ratio between non-agricultural 
sectors and agriculture (IR) is calculated as the ratio of respective sectoral value-added per 
worker and is expected to have a positive impact on annual migration. The ratio of 
agricultural to non-agricultural labour force (LR) controls for the impact of the labour pool in 
agriculture as the sending sector. To approximate for a change of relative prices the ratio 
between the GDP deflators for agriculture and for the aggregated non-agricultural sector is 
interpreted as Terms of Trade (TOT).  
To reflect the uncertainty with respect to finding a new employment outside agriculture, the 
unemployment rate (Unemp) is introduced as explanatory variable. However, as explained 
above the unemployment rate does not reflect sectorally differentiated developments. The 
variable unutilized capacity of the non-agricultural sector (Uncap) is included to take sectoral 
differences into account. In the case of market driven labour flows migration should increase 
if non-agricultural sectors enjoy cycles of boom. We follow a fairly simple approach proposed 
by Butzer et al. (2002, 2003) and define the highest real sectoral value added in services for 
each country as maximum. Unutilized capacity is calculated accordingly as current output 
relative to the maximum. All sectoral production data are from the National Accounts Main 
Aggregates Database of the United Nations (2010). A slowing down or even reversal of 
labour adjustment in times of economic downturns would support the ‘labour shading 
hypothesis’.  
Chenery & Taylor (1968) as well as Raiser, et al., (2004) show that economic wealth of a 
country is a significant determinant of structural change. Therefore, GDP per capita is 
included as explanatory variable (GDPpc) and expected to lead to a higher migration out of 
agriculture. Furthermore, this variable is thought to cover remaining unobserved 
characteristics that might affect labour adjustment. 
Sources of all explanatory variables and descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1 around here 
 
Specification 
Turning to the appropriate econometric framework to analyze the determinants of labour 
adjustment, a panel data estimator seems to be appropriate for mainly two reasons. First, 
taking simple averages of the annual rate of adjustment will ignore important cross-country 
differences of this measure’s development over time. Second, countries follow different 
economic as well as agricultural policies and they might use different technologies. Panel data 
estimators allow capturing all those hardly observable characteristics in a country-specific 
variable. The measure of labour adjustment, mit, will be explained by a vector of explanatory 
variables Xit, the unobserved country-specific variable υi and an error term ε (Equation 2). 
Depending on the assumption regarding the variable υi, different estimators are available.
8
 
The so-called fixed-effects estimator (FEM) bases on the assumption of υi as a time-invariant 
country-specific constant. Parameters of the fixed-effects estimator are identified from within-
country variation. Thus, parameters of variables of initial and institutional conditions without 
any variation over time could not be estimated in this framework (Baltagi, 2005). The 
random-effects estimator (REM) treats the variable υi as an additional country-specific error 
term. A Hausman test is used to decide which of the two frameworks is appropriate. The 
random-effects estimator will result in biased coefficients if there is a correlation between the 
explanatory variables and the individual effect. Therefore, the Hausman test compares the 
covariance matrix of the regressors in the FE model with those in the RE model to determine 
if there is a significant correlation between the explanatory variables and the unobserved 
effects. To take a possible delay in individual occupational decision following changes of 
macroeconomic conditions into account, all explanatory variables enter Equation 2 with their 
one-year lagged values (Xit-1). 
(2)   itiitit Xy ευβ ++= −1  
Two reasons lead to the limitation of the econometric analysis on the period after the start of 
economic reforms. First, measurement errors might be higher under central planning, for 
instance pre-transition data might suffer from the inclusion of social services provided by 
collectives for their employees. Political reforms lead, second, to the break-up of the Soviet 
                                                 
8
 For a more detailed treatment of the different approaches to analyse such cross-sectional time-series data sets, 
the interested reader is referred to Baltagi (2005) and Greene (2000). 
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Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Most data concerning the successor states are only 
available after their emergence. The data covers up to 28 years with most of the countries 
starting in 1990.
9
  
The econometric analysis starts from a base specification controlling for intersectoral income 
differences, the relative size of agricultural labour, development of relative prices, 
unemployment, unutilized capacity in non-agricultural sectors and a country’s level of 
economic development. In a second step measures of the economic reforms, privatisation of 
land and quality of the institutional environment are added. Various interaction effects 
between the institutional variables and the intersectoral income ratio control for possible non-
linear relationships. 
 
4 RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
 
Table 2 around here 
 
Table 2 shows the average of the labour adjustment rate per annum in per cent of the 
agricultural labour force and the average income ratio for all countries over the sample period. 
The average adjustment rate varies between an outflow of up to 8 percent of the agricultural 
labour force (Estonia) and an inflow of up to 9 percent (Georgia).
10
 The ranking is highly 
correlated with the change in agriculture’s share on total labour (see Figure 1).
11
 Comparing 
these estimates with averages over the second half of the twentieth century by Mundlak 
(2000) for a large cross-country sample shows a comparatively high adjustment rate for 
Estonia, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic after the beginning of economic 
reforms. Annual rates above 5% of agricultural employment are quite uncommon on a global 
                                                 
9
 Pre-reform data of sectoral employment are available for Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Poland and Romania only. 
10
 The average annual migration rate between 1989 and 2004 in the five federal states on the territory of the 
former GDR, as comparison, amounts to 6.2 % and the income ratio to 1.6. Therefore, East Germany fits better 
in the group of Estonia, Hungary, Slovak Republic and Czech Republic.  
11
 The levels as well as country’s ranking regarding the average annual migration over the post-reform period 
and the change of agriculture’s share on total employment are correlated with coefficients of 0.92 (Pearson) and 
0.77 (Spearman). 
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scale. However, labour flow into agriculture like in Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan or 
Bulgaria is even more outstanding.  
A closer look reveals that the average rate masks significant temporal differences between and 
within countries as Figure 2 shows. Four countries, Czech Republic, Romania, Poland and 
China, are depicted as typical examples and their annual migration rates are plotted. The 
average adjustment rate of 4 per cent in the Czech Republic is highly influenced by the 
development after 1990 where up to 20 percent of agriculture’s labour force left the sector in 
only one year. The period before (1981-1988) is characterised by an adjustment rate near 
zero. On the contrary, Romanian data indicate a flow from non-agricultural occupation to 
agriculture after 1989 amounting up to 10 percent of agricultural employment. Different ways 
of privatisation and speed of subsequent restructuring are acknowledged as one of the main 
reasons (Rozelle & Swinnen, 2004). Poland, as a third example, experienced increased labour 
flow out of agriculture but not such a sharp shift in the adjustment rate in the early half of the 
1990s. Rates higher than 5 per cent of sector’s labour force occurs only in the years 1994 to 
1999. One possible explanation could be the quite different production structure in Polish 
agriculture already before the break-up of the planned economic system. Agricultural sector 
was already dominated by private farm households compared to large cooperatives in 
Czechoslovakia or Romania. Therefore, no immediate and large scale release of labour from 
collective farms like in Czech Republic or East Germany took place. Finally and as a last 
example in Figure 2, China shows a large decrease of agriculture’s share on total employment 
since 1978 whereas the annual adjustment rate is mostly positive but comparatively low (2% 
of agricultural labour force). This might also be influenced by restrictions on regional 
movements which were quite pervasive in China. Summarising these findings, the 
occupational change might be driven by two different general developments: First, it 
encompasses the actual change of occupation of previous workers. Rapid restructuring of 
agricultural cooperatives or state enterprises and the imposition of hard budget constraints 
resulted in high dismissals of agricultural workers, which fits the situation in the Czech 
Republic in 1990-93. Contrary, the collapse of the non-agricultural sector and the access to 
agricultural land led to a high inflow of labour into agriculture in Romania over the first half 
of the 1990s. Second, the decision of new young entrants into an economy’s labour force 
which eschew the agricultural sector and prefer to work in non-agriculture results in a more 
continuous sectoral change in employment. This is more likely to describe the development in 
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Poland and China where sectoral change is driven to a large extent by the demographic 
development (Pang et al., 2004).  
 
Figure 2 around here 
 
Based on the average agricultural liberalization index, the sample is divided into fast, 
moderate and slow reformers.
12
 All of the six countries which were judged as fast reformers 
belong to the first European Union’s acceding countries in 2004. The four countries judged as 
slowest reformers were Belarus and the three Central Asian countries, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Surprisingly, sectoral change already took place in the pre-
reform period in the European countries were data are available. Looking at Figure 3 reveals 
that the group of fast reformers experience a sharp decline of agricultural employment right 
after the first reforms. Labour adjustment rates (Figure 3) increase sharply, hinting to the 
conclusion that a faster agricultural liberalization is linked to the ‘restructuring hypothesis’ 
mentioned above. The largest and very heterogeneous group of moderate reformers displays 
on average a sharp labour flow into agriculture. The same applies, although to a lesser extent, 
for the slowly reforming countries. Both groups fit the ‘labour shading hypothesis’, 
agriculture provides a pool for labour at times of economic turmoil. Increasing migration from 
agriculture starts only from the second half of the 1990s onwards. In those countries 
agriculture seems to play the role of a labour shading sector at the beginning of economic 
reforms and converts to a labour sending sector later on.  
 
Figure 3 around here 
 
A first look on the calculated income ratios shows an interesting picture. The variable varies 
within a broad range between 0.5 and 7.2. Whereas CIS’s countries and Georgia exhibit 
income ratios below two in 1990 and 1991, it increases significantly over the sample period 
and reaches relatively high levels above three in Tajikistan, Georgia and Turkmenistan. Non-
CIS countries show a higher variation of income ratios already at the beginning of the sample 
                                                 
12
 To be consistent with the thresholds in Figure 1, fast reformers have an average index of agricultural 
liberalisation above 8, slow reformers an average agricultural liberalisation index below 5 and medium reformers 
lie in between.  
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period. Within the CEEC the ratios are below two over the last decade except for Poland, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, Slovenia and Croatia. These countries, plus Albania, exhibit 
still the highest share of agricultural employment in this country group. Finally, Asian 
transition countries experience increasing income ratios already starting from a rather high 
level. Output per worker in non-agricultural sectors is more than four times the agricultural 
GDP per worker. These results are comparable with estimates from developing countries by 
Larson and Mundlak (1997) for Asia and Latin America. Only African countries show higher 
income differentials between the non-agricultural sector and agriculture. 
 
4.2 Results of the econometric analysis 
After the descriptive analysis the impact of potential determinants of labour adjustment is 
explored econometrically. Due to missing and potentially less reliable data in the pre-reform 
period, the econometric analyses covers the years after the first economic reforms only.13 
Relying on previous empirical analyses a base specification is estimated first. The 
specification controls for the impact of the intersectoral income ratio, labour ratio, an 
interaction term of income and labour ratio, terms of trade, unemployment, unutilized 
capacity in non-agricultural sectors and GDP per capita. Subsequently, institutional variables 
are included stepwise in the specifications to quantify their exclusive impact. Relatively high 
correlation between some of the explanatory variables would reduce their usefulness in one 
single specification. Results of all specifications are reported in Table 3. 
The Breusch-Pagan test favours the panel approach in all specifications compared to a cross-
sectional analysis. Additionally, the Hausman test leads to a rejection of the random-effects 
model. Therefore, in all specifications exists unobserved characteristics which are highly 
correlated with the labour adjustment rate. Additional controls for time-fixed effects turn out 
not to be jointly statistically significant.  
Both variables, income ratio (IR) and labour ratio (LR), have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on labour adjustment. Similar results are reported by (Swinnen, et al., 2005)) 
for a much smaller sample of East European transition countries. However, the effect is not 
linear as shown by the interaction effect between both variables. The estimated coefficient 
suggests a decreasing influence of IR and LR for countries with a higher intersectoral income 
                                                 
13
 It is followed the line of Macours & Swinnen (2002) and the relevant years are defined as 1978 for China, 
1981 for Vietnam, 1989 for all CEECs, including Slovenia, and 1990 for countries of the FSU, Mongolia and 
former Yugoslavia except Slovenia. 
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difference given the labour ratio or countries with a higher share of agricultural labour force 
given the income ratio. A development of relative prices favourable to agriculture (ToT) as 
well as higher unemployment (Unemp) each reduces the labour adjustment process. 
Especially the last estimate supports the hypothesis of agriculture as a labour shading sector in 
times of high unemployment. The result is in line with findings by Mundlak, Cavallo, & 
Domenech (1989) as well as Mundlak & Coeymans (1993) who find a depressing effect of 
unemployment on migration for Argentina and Chile. Unutilized capacity within non-
agricultural sectors (Uncap) show neither a statistically nor an economic impact on 
intersectoral labour flows. This result is contrary to findings by Butzer et al. (2002, 2003) 
where unutilized capacity reduces labour flows in developing countries significantly.  
 
Table 3 around here  
 
Turning to the impact of a changing institutional framework, column 2 of Table 3 presents 
results of the specification controlling for land privatisation strategies. Due to the time-
invariant nature of the privatisation variables, only coefficients of interaction effects with the 
intersectoral income difference are estimated. The results in column highlight that countries 
which have opted for restitution of agricultural land to former owners (Restitution*IR) 
experience a significantly higher migration from agriculture. However, the estimated 
coefficient for the distribution of land shares (Shares*IR) has a positive sign and is 
statistically significant too. Thus, beside full restitution also the distribution of shares seem to 
enhance labour adjustment. The coefficient attached to distribution of land in kind 
(Distribution*IR) is smaller and fails to be statistically significant. Taking up the literature 
mentioned in the introduction, these results support the ‘restructuring hypothesis’. However, 
other forms of privatisation without the re-establishment of full property rights are predicted 
to yield a similar effect.  
Turning to the third specification controlling for the degree of economic reforms shows a 
positive and statistically significant effect. As expected liberalisation leads to a faster labour 
adjustment. However, the interaction effect with the income ratio (EBRD*IR) points to a 
lower effect of liberalisation with an increasing intersectoral income gap. The last two 
columns of Table 3 control for the quality of the institutional environment. Both variables 
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turn out not to be statistically significant determinants of labour adjustment. The same holds 
for the respective interaction effects.  
 
5 CONCLUSION 
Transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as Asia have chosen different ways 
to transform their agricultural sectors from a planned to a market economy. The adjustment of 
agricultural labour force partly reflects these different approaches with increasing labour use 
in some countries and a sharply declining employment in agriculture in others. In this paper, a 
labour adjustment rate is calculated for a panel of 30 transition countries over the last two 
decennia. Very high annual rates of labour away from agriculture like in Hungary, Estonia or 
Czech Republic as well as significant flow of labour into agriculture like in Armenia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Bulgaria are quite unique on a global scale. Subsequently, 
potential determinants of the labour adjustment rate are evaluated in an econometric panel 
data framework. Beside sector-specific characteristics, the speed of general economic 
reforms, the ways of land privatisation, and quality of the institutional environment are 
analysed.  
Results of fixed-effects estimations reveal that annual labour adjustment is positively 
correlated with the income ratio between non-agricultural sectors and agriculture, the labour 
ratio between both sectors, the development of relative prices and the unemployment rate. 
Additionally, the existence of statistically significant country specific unobserved effects 
justifies the choice of panel data approaches. Among the institutional variables the way of 
land privatisation and the speed of economic reforms show a statistically significant impact 
on the labour adjustment process.  
The finding of a robust and significant correlation between sectoral income differences and 
labour adjustment is in line with previous theoretical and empirical literature. People react to 
economic incentives and move out of the sector which delivers on average a lower income 
relative to other sectors. A relatively high and still increasing income ratio in Armenia, China, 
Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan points to the existence of mobility restrictions in 
those countries. Although the detailed characteristics of these mobility barriers are unexplored 
here, an increased labour flow from agriculture to non-agriculture will be expected in the case 
of further economic liberalization in the future. Similarly, any policy which tries to restrict 
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labour adjustment and structural change will potentially increase intersectoral income gaps 
and will surely lead to a higher pressure on structural adjustments. 
Governments and administration of countries with a still high agricultural employment should 
be aware of a relatively high rate of labour adjustment and subsequent faster structural 
change.  
Surprisingly, both the restitution of land as well as the distribution of shares led to a higher 
adjustment rate than the distribution of land in kind. Such a result somewhat contradicts 
theoretical expectations that only the establishment of clear property rights will result in a 
faster structural change. Results of interaction effects between privatization strategies and the 
intersectoral income difference suggest an increasing relevance of the way of land 
privatisation with an increasing sectoral income inequality.  
Furthermore, the results indicate that agriculture plays a labour shading role in countries 
which implement economic reforms more slowly as has been shown for instance for the CIS 
countries. However, agriculture’s role might change over the course of economic reforms in 
releasing labour, supporting the ‘restructuring hypothesis’, as reforms progress. Potential for 
future research has been identified with respect to the determinants of the intersectoral income 
ratio and dynamic behaviour of structural change. 
 
REFERENCES:  
Aron, J. (2000). Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence. World Bank Research 
Observer, 15(1), 99-135. 
Baltagi, B. H. (2005). Econometric analysis of panel data. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 3
rd
 
ed. 
Barkley, A. P. (1990). The Determinants of the Migration of Labour out of Agriculture in the 
United States, 1940-85. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 72, 567-573. 
Bernabè, S., & Stampini, M. (2009). Labour Mobility during Transition: Evidence from 
Georgia. Economics of Transition, 17(2), 377-409.  
Bojnec, S., & Dries, L. (2005). Causes of Changes in Agricultural Employment in Slovenia: 
Evidence from Micro-data. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 56(3), 399-416. 
Brada, J. C. (1989). Technological progress and factor utilization in Eastern European 
economic growth. Economica 56: 433-448. 
 20 
Brosig, S., Glauben, T., Herzfeld, T., Rozelle, S., & Wang, X. (2007). The dynamics of 
Chinese rural households' participation in labour markets. Agricultural Economics 37: 167-
178. 
Buchenrieder, G., Knüpfer, J., & Heidhues, F. (2002). A cross-country comparison of non-
farm employment in the Balkans. Research in Development Economics and Policy Discussion 
Paper No. 03/2002. Stuttgart: University of Hohenheim. 
Butzer, R., Larson, D. F., & Mundlak, Y. (2002). Intersectoral migration in Venezuela. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 50: 227-248. 
Butzer, R., Mundlak, Y., & Larson, D. F. (2003). Intersectoral migration in Southeast Asia: 
Evidence from Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Journal of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics 35: 105-117. 
Chaplin, H., Davidova, S., & Gorton, M. (2004). Agricultural adjustment and the 
diversification of farm households and corporate farms in Central Europe. Journal of Rural 
Studies 20: 61-77. 
Chenery, H. B., & Taylor, L. (1968). Development patterns: Among countries and over time. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 50: 391-416. 
Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S., & Olson, M. (1999). Contract-Intensive Money: Contract 
Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance. Journal of Economic Growth, 
4(2), 185.  
Csaki, C., & Zuschlag, A. (2003). The agrarian economies of Central-Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States: An update on status and progress in 2002. ECSSD 
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Working Paper No. 37. Washington 
D.C.: World Bank. 
Csaki, C., & Lerman, Z. (1997). Land reform and farm restructuring in East Central Europe 
and CIS in the 1990s: Expectations and achievements after the first five years. European 
Review of Agricultural Economics 24: 428-452. 
de Brauw, A., Huang, J., Rozelle, S., Zhang, L., & Zhang, Y. (2002). The evolution of China's 
rural labour markets during the reforms. Journal of Comparative Economics 30: 329-353. 
Deiniger, K. (2003). Land policies for growth and poverty reduction. Washington, D. C.: 
Oxford University Press. 
Dries, L., & Swinnen, J. F. M. (2002). Institutional reform and labour reallocation during 
transition: Theory evidence from Polish agriculture. World Development 30: 457-474. 
EBRD (2010). Transition indicators. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
<http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm>. 
 21 
FAO (2010). FAOSTAT, PopSTAT – Annual time series. Food and Agriculture Organisation 
of the United Nations, <http://faostat.fao.org/site/550/default.aspx>. 
Glauben, T., Herzfeld, T., & Wang, X. (2008). Labour market participation of Chinese 
agricultural households: Empirical evidence from Zhejiang province. Food Policy 33: 329-
340. 
Harris, J. R., & Todaro, M. P. (1970). Migration, unemployment and development: A two-
sector analysis. American Economic Review 60: 126-142. 
ILO 2010. Laboursta Internet. International Labour Office, <http://laboursta.ilo.org>. 
Jackman, R. (1994). Economic policy and employment in the transition economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe: What have we learned? International Labour Review 133: 327-345. 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. (2009). Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and 
Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008. In World Bank (Ed.), Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 4978. Washington D.C. 
Koester, U., & Brümmer, B. (2006). Institutional changes for agricultural and rural 
development in the CEEC and CIS region. electronic Journal of Agricultural and 
Development Economics 3: 144-179. 
Larson, D. F., & Mundlak, Y. (1997). On the intersectoral migration of agricultural labour. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 45: 295-319. 
Lerman, Z., Csaki, C., & Feder, G. (2004). Agriculture in transition: Land policies and 
evolving farm structures in Post-Soviet countries. Lanham: Lexington Books. 
Lerman, Z., Kislev, Y., Biton, D., & Kriss, A. (2003). Agricultural output and productivity in 
the Former Soviet republics. Economic Development and Cultural Change 51: 999-1018. 
Macours, K., & Swinnen, J. F. M. (2002). Patterns of agrarian transition. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 50: 265-294. 
Macours, K., & Swinnen, J. F. M. (2000). Impact of initial conditions and reform policies on 
agricultural performance in Central and Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, and East 
Asia. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82: 1149-1155. 
Massey, D. S., Arango, J., & Hugo, G. (1993). Theories of international migration: A review 
and appraisal. Population and Development Review 19: 431-466. 
Mathjis, E., & Swinnen, J. F. M. (2001). Production organization and efficiency during 
transition: An empirical analysis of East German agriculture. Review of Economics and 
Statistics 83: 100-107. 
Mundlak, Y. (2000). Agriculture and economic growth: Theory and measurement. 
Cambridge/ London: Harvard University Press. 
 22 
Mundlak, Y., & Coeymans, J. E. (1993). Sectoral growth in Chile: 1962-82. Research Report 
95. Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). 
Mundlak, Y., Cavallo, D., & Domenech, R. (1989). Agriculture and economic growth in 
Argentina, 1913-84. Research Report 76. International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Washington D.C. 
Mundlak, Y. (1978). Occupational migration out of agriculture: A cross-country analysis. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 60: 392-398. 
North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5: 97-112. 
Pallot, J., & Nefedova, T. (2003). Trajectories in people's farming in Moscow oblast during 
the Post-socialist transformation. Journal of Rural Studies 19: 345-362. 
Pang, L., de Brauw, A., & Rozelle, S. (2004). Working until you drop: The elderly of rural 
China. China Journal 52: 73-96. 
Raiser, M., Schaffer, M., & Schuchhardt, J. (2004). Benchmarking structural change in 
transition. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 15: 47-81. 
Rozelle, S., & Swinnen, J. F. M. (2004). Success and failure of reform: Insights from the 
transition of agriculture. Journal of Economic Literature 42: 404-456. 
Schmitt, G. (1989). Simon Kuznets’ ’sectoral shares in the labour force’: A different 
explanation of his (I+S)/A ratio. American Economic Review 79: 1262-1276. 
Seeth, H. tho, Chachnov, S., Surinov, A., &von Braun, J. 1998. Russian poverty: Muddling 
through economic transition with garden plots. World Development 26: 1611-1623. 
Sorm, V., &Terrell, K. D. (2000). Sectoral restructuring and labour mobility: A comparative 
look at the Czech Republic. Journal of Comparative Economics 28: 431-455. 
Swinnen, J. F. M., Dries, L., & Macours, K. (2005). Transition and agricultural labour. 
Agricultural Economics 32: 15-34. 
Swinnen, J. F. M. (1999). The political economy of land reform choices in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Economics of Transition 7: 637-664. 
Taylor, J. E., & Philip L. M.. (2001). Human capital: Migration and rural population change. 
In Handbook of agricultural economics, Volume 1A, ed. Gardner, Bruce L., and Gordon C. 
Rausser. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 457-511. 
Taylor, J. E., Rozelle, S., & de Brauw, A. (2003). Migration and incomes in source 
communities: A new economics of migration perspective from China. Economic Development 
and Cultural Change 52: 75-101. 
Todaro, M. P. (1969). A model of labour migration and urban unemployment in Less 
Developed Countries. American Economic Review 59: 138-148. 
 23 
United Nations. (2010). National accounts main aggregates database. <http://unstats.un.org/ 
unsd/snaama/introduction.asp>. 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. (2000). <http://www.unece.org/stats/ 
documents/ces/2000/19.add.5.e.pdf>. 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. (2007). UNECE Statistical Database. 
<http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/Dialog/>. 
World Bank (2010). World Development Indicators, CD-Rom. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank. 
World Bank (1996). World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market, Oxford 
University Press. 
Zarembka, P. (1970). Labour migration and urban unemployment: Comment. American 
Economic Review 60: 184-186. 
Zhang, L., De Brauw, A., & Rozelle, S. (2004). China's rural labour market development and 
its gender implications. China Economic Review 15: 230-247. 
 
 24 
 
Table 1: Definition and source of variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Code Mean 
(Standard 
deviation) 
Source 
Migration rate m 0.0043 
(0.085) 
ILO, World Bank, FAO, 
UNECE, National statistics 
Ratio between non-agricultural 
and agricultural GDP per worker 
IR 2.158 
(1.409) 
UN (2010) 
Ratio between agricultural and 
non-agricultural labour force 
LR 0.639 
(0.649) 
ILO, World Bank, National 
statistics 
Terms of trade TOT 0.830 
(0.448) 
UN (2010) 
Ratio of employment-to-
population ratio and labour force 
participation rate [in %] 
Unemp 12.86 
(8.538) 
ILO 
Non-agricultural unutilized 
capacity (% of maximum non-
agricultural GDP) 
Uncap 29.524 
(189.11) 
UN (2010) 
Log of GDP per capita GDPpc 7.031 
(1.079) 
World Bank (2010) 
Dummy for distribution of land in 
kind 
Distribution 0.338 
(0.474) 
Rozelle & Swinnen (2004) 
Dummy for distribution of land in 
shares 
Shares 0.287 
(0.453) 
Rozelle & Swinnen (2004) 
Dummy for restitution of land to 
former owners 
Restitution 0.272 
(0.446) 
Rozelle & Swinnen (2004) 
EBRD Transition indicators EBRD 2.204 
(0.810) 
EBRD (2010) 
Contract-intensive money CIM 0.751 
(0.144) 
IMF 
Composite indicator of quality of 
governance 
KKM 4.508 
(1.448) 
Kaufmann, et al. (2009) 
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Table 2:  Average values of labour adjustment rate and income ratio 
Country Migration 
rate (m)  
Income ratio 
(IR) 
Albania -1.7 2.03 
Armenia -7.9 1.66 
Azerbaijan 0.8 2.16 
Belarus 3.2 0.84 
Bosnia and Herzegovina -1.4 0.33 
Bulgaria -2.0 2.44 
China 2.1 4.06 
Croatia 1.8 2.50 
Czech Republic 6.2 0.57 
Estonia 7.6 0.84 
Georgia -9.2 2.20 
Hungary 7.7 1.75 
Kazakhstan -4.8 1.06 
Kyrgyzstan -3.3 1.35 
Latvia 1.0 0.84 
Lithuania 0.2 0.74 
Macedonia -1.2 2.57 
Moldova -2.1 2.33 
Mongolia -1.7 3.85 
Poland 2.1 3.95 
Romania -1.4 2.16 
Russia 1.0 0.81 
Serbia and Montenegro -8.3 1.03 
Slovak Republic 5.6 1.58 
Slovenia -0.5 2.59 
Tajikistan -3.4 4.33 
Turkmenistan -1.1 3.34 
Ukraine -0.7 1.41 
Uzbekistan 1.5 1.28 
Vietnam 1.4 4.30 
Source:  Own calculations based on World Bank (2010), ILO (2010), FAO (2010), United Nations (2010) and 
national statistics 
Note:  Migration rate in per cent. Geometric means are calculated by adding a constant one to annual 
migration rates and subtracting afterwards. Italic values are significantly different from zero at a 5% 
level.  
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Table 3:  Determinants of labour adjustment 
 Base model Land 
privatisation 
Reform speed Institutional environment 
Constant 1.02*** 
(0.04) 
0.98*** 
(0.04) 
0.89*** 
(0.05) 
0.96*** 
(0.07) 
0.93*** 
(0.10) 
IRt-1 0.04*** 
(0.001) 
0.05*** 
(0.009) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.03) 
LRt-1 0.15*** 
(0.04) 
0.19*** 
(0.04) 
0.21*** 
(0.04) 
0.22*** 
(0.05) 
0.22*** 
(0.05) 
IRt-1* LRt-1 -0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.008) 
-0.03*** 
(0.008) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
ToTt-1 -0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
Unempt-1 -0.66*** 
(0.17) 
-0.53*** 
(0.17) 
-0.73*** 
(0.16) 
-0.51*** 
(0.17) 
-0.66*** 
(0.20) 
Uncapt-1 -3.5*E-6 
(4*E-5) 
1.5*E-5 
(3.9*E-5) 
-4*E-5 
(2*E-4) 
-8.1*E-6 
(4*E-5) 
7.5*E-6 
(4.8*E-5) 
GDPpct-1 0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.1* 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01* 
(0.007) 
Restitution*IRt-1  0.12*** 
(0.03) 
   
Distribution*IRt-1  -0.01 
(0.03) 
   
Shares*IRt-1  0.08*** 
(0.03) 
   
EBRD   0.03*** 
(0.005) 
  
CIM    -0.03 
(0.08) 
 
KKM     -0.0003 
(0.02) 
Interaction effect 
with IRt-1 
  -0.01*** 
(0.001) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Hausman test 48.90*** 101.94*** 85.77*** 101.45*** 80.67*** 
β = 0 12.55*** 10.82*** 15.20*** 10.30*** 8.31*** 
R
2
  0.17 0.20 0.26 0.19 0.19 
ρ 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.68 0.75 
N/ Countries 471/ 29 471/ 29 436/ 28 424/ 28 362/ 29 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance 
are indicated with ***, **, and *, respectively. The row β=0 reports the test statistic of a F-test under 
the H0 that all coefficients are equal to zero. The displayed R
2
 (within) measures only the contribution 
of the explanatory variables without the unobserved country-specific effects. The ρ indicates the share 
of the explained variation due to the country-specific effects. Due to missing for the employment-to-
population ratio sample without Serbia-Montenegro. EBRD indicator not available for China and 
Vietnam. CIM index not available for Uzbekistan. 
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Figure 1:  Change in agriculture's share on total labour since start of reform 
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Notes:  Percentage change between 1989 and 2005, except Bosnia and Herzegovina (1999-2005), China 
(1978-2005), Croatia (1996-2005), Macedonia (1991-2005), Serbia & Montenegro (1996-2005), 
Turkmenistan (1990-2004), Vietnam (1981-2005); all other countries of FSU and Mongolia (1990-
2005); ranking according to the index of agricultural liberalization by Csaki & Zuschlag, (2003) in 
2002 
Source:  Own calculations based on World Bank (2010), ILO (2010), FAO (2010) and national statistics. 
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Figure 2:   Annual agricultural labour adjustment for selected economies (1979-2005) 
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Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2010), ILO (2010), FAO (2010) and national statistics 
 
Figure 3: Average agricultural labour adjustment by index of agricultural liberalization, 1979-2005 
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Notes:  Ranking according to the average index of agricultural liberalization by Csaki & Zuschlag (2003) 
Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2010), ILO (2010), FAO (2010), United Nations (2010) and 
national statistics 
 
